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Abstract
Purpose – As part of the banking reform, major commercial banks in China went through initial
public offerings (IPOs) in the past two decades. Has this change in the ownership structure led to
improvement in their performance? With a comprehensive data set of Chinese banks over 1999-2010,
the purpose of this paper is to investigate the effects of IPOs on bank performance in China.
Design/methodology/approach – The authors employ a stochastic frontier approach (SFA) to
measure bank efficiency and assess the selection and dynamic effects of public listing.
Findings – The authors find strong selection effects. That is, banks that choose to go public
are significantly more efficient than those that do not. However, the analysis of the dynamic effects
shows no evidence that bank efficiency improves after going public, either in the short run or
in the long run. The authors further look into bank performance around IPO events with
non-parametric analysis and find that banks significantly outperform their counterparts prior to IPOs,
but this superior performance disappears immediately after IPOs. This evidence is consistent with
the “window dressing” hypothesis that firms time new issues to take advantage of windows of
opportunity.
Originality/value – This is the first study that addresses the performance of IPO banks measured
with SFA in China after 2005 when the major Chinese banks were listed.
Keywords China, Banks, Initial public offering, Post-IPO performance
Paper type Research paper
1. Introduction
China’s banking industry has gone through significant reforms in the past two decades.
The industry has transformed from a monopoly of state-owned banks to a spectrum of
banks with different sizes, regional orientation and ownership structure. Currently,
banks operating in China are classified into four major categories: banks with majority
ownership by the state (Big Four), joint-stock banks, city commercial banks and
foreign-funded banks. Banks with majority ownership by the state are those that were
previously wholly state-owned banks but have diversified their ownership structure
during the bank reform. Initial public offerings (IPOs) have been an important part
of ownership diversification and reform of state-owned banks in China. By the end of
2010, 16 Chinese banks went through IPOs and became listed in China’s inland and
overseas stock markets, which includes the Big Four, nine joint-stock banks and three
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city commercial banks. Table I provides detailed IPO information of the publically
listed banks of China[1].
An IPO is an important way for firms to raise equity capital and grow. It is also
one of the methods to privatize state-owned enterprises. According to the World Bank,
IPOs accounted for 75 percent of total privatization value in 2007 globally. In the
banking industry, the most commonly used method to privatize state-owned banks
include attracting foreign strategic investors to participate in domestic bank ownership
and IPOs. Bank privatization in the middle- and low-income countries has been
extensively examined in the literature. These studies use different measures for
bank performance, cover different countries and periods and find mixed evidence on
how bank performance is affected by privatization. For example, Berger et al. (2005)
examine the privatization effect on bank performance in Argentina, and find that profit
efficiency and loan portfolio quality improved after privatization, but no significant
change in cost efficiency is observed[2]. Boubakri et al. (2005) examine the post-
privatization performance of 81 banks from 22 developing countries and find that
banks chosen for privatization have a lower economic efficiency and a lower solvency
than banks kept under government ownership. They also find that in the post-
privatization period, profitability increases but, depending on the type of owner, efficiency,
risk exposure and capitalization may worsen or improve. However, they find that in the
long run, privatization yields significant improvements in economic efficiency and credit
risk exposure. Clarke et al. (2005) summarize the findings on bank privatization from
a broad set of country-specific and cross-country studies, and report that at least some
measures of bank performance are improved after privatization in most countries,
although some other measures do not change.
Although there is extensive literature on examining the effect of privatization
on bank performance, few studies have distinguished IPOs from other ways of
privatization. Among studies on Chinese banks, Lin and Zhang (2009) and Jiang et al.
(2009) both examine the effect of bank ownership reform on bank performance. Lin and
Zhang use financial ratios to measure bank profitability, efficiency and asset quality
Bank name Bank type IPO date
China Construction Bank Corporation (CCBC)a State-owned banks October 27, 2005
Bank of China Limited (BOC)a State-owned banks June 1, 2006
Industrial & Commercial Bank of China (ICBC)a State-owned banks October 27, 2006
Agricultural Bank of China Limited (ABC)a State-owned banks July 16, 2010
Shenzhen Development Bank Co. Ltd Joint-stock banks April 3, 1991
Shanghai Pudong Development Bank Joint-stock banks November 10, 1999
China Minsheng Banking Corporation Joint-stock banks December 19, 2000
China Merchants Bank Co. Ltd Joint-stock banks April 9, 2002
Hua Xia Bank Co. Limited Joint-stock banks September 12, 2003
Industrial Bank Co. Ltd Joint-stock banks February 5, 2007
China CITIC Bank Corporation Limited Joint-stock banks April 27, 2007
China Everbright Bank Co. Ltd Joint-stock banks August 18, 2010
Bank of Communications Co. Ltd Joint-stock banks June 23, 2005
Bank of Nanjing City commercial banks July 19, 2007
Bank of Ningbo City commercial banks July 19, 2007
Bank of Beijing Co. Ltd City commercial banks October 1, 2007













































and find that although banks undergoing foreign acquisitions or public listing
record better pre-event performance, little change in performance is found after the
ownership change. Jiang et al. find that banks that have gone through IPOs or
otherwise diversified their ownership structure are more efficient than others, but IPOs
only have some short-term effects.
In the IPO literature, the performance of IPO firms in non-financial industries has
been well documented. Some IPO studies focus on the post-issue stock price performance
(e.g. Ritter, 1991; Loughran and Ritter, 1995), while others address the operating
performance of firms after IPOs (e.g. Jain and Kini, 1994; Degeorge and Zeckhauser, 1993).
In a study on IPOs in China, Kao et al. (2009) find that on average firms experience a
decline in post-IPO profitability and poor long-run stock performance.
However, studies focussing on bank performance after IPOs are still rare. Houge and
Loughran (1999) examine a sample of 393 bank IPOs in the USA from 1983 to 1991
and find poor post-IPO performance, especially among larger institutions with more
aggressive loan growth. Their evidence suggests that the market may have fixated on
the rapid growth of these institutions. To the best of our knowledge, there is no study
in the literature that examines the post-IPO performance of Chinese banks. Although
Lin and Zhang (2009) and Jiang et al. (2009) both cover bank IPO in their studies as one
way of ownership structure reform in China, as is reviewed earlier, their coverage of the
IPO banks is very limited. Their sample period is up to 2004 and 2005, respectively,
and the number of publically listed banks covered in their study is very limited. As is
shown in Table I, most of the major bank IPOs took place after 2005. The lack of
comprehensive studies of IPOs in the banking industry, especially in China, leaves us
space for more research on this issue.
In this study, we examine the post-IPO performance of banks in China over the
period 1999-2010. We measure bank performance with technical efficiency (TE) scores
and TE ranks that are estimated with the stochastic frontier approach (SFA) and a
production function. With the method developed by Berger et al. (2005), the regression
analysis shows that banks that choose to go for public listing are significantly more
efficient than others that do not. We call this the selection effect. However, we do not
find any dynamic effect. That is, banks do not gain efficiency after IPOs, either in the
short run or the long run.
By further looking into the performance of IPO banks and their matched industry
counterparts based on bank size and ownership characteristic year by year, we
find that the IPO banks significantly outperform their industry counterparts in the year
prior to IPO, but underperformed the control banks for three of the four years
immediately after IPO (Years 0-3). The most pronounced decline in performance is from
the year prior to IPO (Year −1) to the year of IPO (Year 0). This provides support for the
window-dressing hypothesis in the literature, which states that IPO firms attempt to
window dress their accounting numbers before IPO andmanipulate investors’ expectations
to attract more investors and sell their stocks at higher prices. The superior performance
prior to IPO is also consistent with the timing hypothesis, which argues that IPO firms
might time their public offerings to coincide with the time when their performance is
extremely good but not sustainable. The poor performance at the year of IPO could be
explained by the fact that some of the one-time expenses associated with IPOs are incurred
in the year of IPOs which adversely affect their performance. By comparing to their
pre-IPO performance, we do not see efficiency gains after IPO. However, we do observe
gradually increasing efficiency for the three years following IPO. This finding is consistent








































costly restructuring may lead to a temporary increase in costs or reduction in profits in
the early years following their IPOs.
Our findings of the selection effects and dynamic effects are consistent with those in
the literature (e.g. Lin and Zhang, 2009). More importantly, our study sheds further
light on bank performance around the IPO year. The rest of the paper is organized
as follows. We describe the methodology and data in Section 2 and discuss the
empirical results in Section 3. The final section concludes.
2. Empirical model and data
2.1 Our empirical model
This study focusses on the effect of IPO event on bank efficiency. We follow the
methodology originally developed by Berger et al. (2005) and recently applied by other
studies such as Lin and Zhang (2009) and Jiang et al. (2009). In these studies, the static,
selection and dynamic effects of bank ownership changes are jointly tested in one
model. Static effects refers to the long-run performance effects associated with constant
ownership structure. In other words, it refers to the performance differences among banks
that have observed no change in governance. Selection effects are the performance
differences between banks that have experienced governance changes and those that are
not. Dynamic effects of governance change deals with the performance effects associated
with governance change. Berger et al. (2005) find that state-owned banks have poor
long-term performance (static effect), banks that underwent privatization had poor
performance beforehand (selection effect) and privatized banks dramatically improved
their performance following privatization (dynamic effect). In this study, we focus on
the selection effects and dynamic effects associated with IPOs of Chinese banks[3]. The
empirical model is specified as follows:
Bank efficiency measures ¼ aþb1 selection IPO indicator
þb2 dynamic IPO indicator_dummy
þb3 dynamic IPO indicator_years since
þb4 control variables
þb5 year fixed effectsþerror term (1)
The variable definitions are reported in Table II and discussed in detail.
2.2 Variables and measurements
2.2.1 Bank efficiency measures. The existing literature takes two approaches to measure
bank operating performance: financial ratios generated from financial accounting
statistics and more sophisticated models. Financial ratios often include return on equity,
return on assets, costs to assets ratio and other profitability, asset quality or efficiency
measures. More sophisticated measures involve different models to estimate bank
performance. In their study of the relationship between bank ownership and performance,
Berger et al. (2005) compile efficiency ranks from efficiency scores that are estimated with
a translog profit or cost function. The efficiency scores are ranked in ascending order and
then converted to a uniform scale over [0, 1]. Jiang et al. (2009) employ a stochastic
distance function approach to calculate the TE score for each bank and examine the effect
of ownership change on bank efficiency in China. In this paper, we use TE scores and










































TE gauges a firm’s ability of optimal utilization of available resources either by
producing maximum output with a given amount of inputs or by using a minimum
amount of inputs to produce a given output. We take the SFA to estimate the TE scores.
SFA was first developed by Aigner et al. (1977) and Meeusen and van den Broeck (1977).
The approach specifies a functional form for the cost, profit or production function, which
allows inefficiencies to be included in the error term. For example, a production function
for a fully efficient firm can be specified as:
lnyit ¼ f ðxit ;bÞþvit (2)
i¼ 1, … , n; t¼ 1, … , T,
where yit is the observed output of producer i at time t, xit and β are vectors of inputs
and the corresponding coefficients, respectively. vit is a zero-mean random error that
describes random shocks affecting the production process. Equation (2) defines the
stochastic frontier of the production function. As a firm’s efficiency is less than or equal
to the efficiency of a fully efficient firm, we subtract a non-negative term uit from the
production function and get a stochastic production frontier model as:
lnyit ¼ f ðxit ;bÞþvituit (3)
Symbol Definition
Endogenous variables
Technical efficiency (TE) Based on the residuals from production functions for each
year. Estimated with stochastic frontier approach (SFA)
Technical efficiency rank
(TE rank)
Based on the residuals from production functions for each
year. Estimated with SFA. Technical efficiency scores are
ranked in ascending order for a year and converted to a
uniform scale over [0, 1]
Exogenous variables
Selection IPO indicator (selection_IPO) Dummy indicating a bank that underwent an IPO over the
1999-2010 period. Equals zero for all other banks
Dynamic IPO indicator_dummy
(dynamic_IPO)
Dummy that takes the value of one for all publically listed
banks for all time periods following the IPO event, and
equals zero for the periods prior to IPO and for all periods
for all the other banks that have not gone public
Dynamic IPO indicator_years since
(dynamic_IPO_time)
Time variable that equals one for the year following the
bank IPO, two for the second year following the IPO and so
on. It equals zero for the years before the IPO and for all
other banks
Control variables
Joint-stock bank Dummy that equals 1 for joint-stock banks and 0 for all
others
City commercial bank Dummy that takes the value of 1 for city commercial banks
and zero for all others
Foreign bank Dummy that equals 1 for foreign banks and 0 for all others
Lnasset Log of total assets in period t–1 for each bank
LnCAP Log of capital asset ratio
Fee-based asset share Share of other earning assets (than loan) in total earning
assets












































where uitW0 is the effect of technical inefficiency and is assumed to have a half-normal
distribution[4]. The non-negative uit in Equation (3) guarantees that the observed log
of output, lnyit , is bounded below the frontier. The value of 100× uit is the percentage
by which output can be increased to reach maximum output potential using the same
inputs. The score of TE can be expressed as:
TEit ¼ exp uitf g (4)
where TEit represents the ratio of observed output of producer i at time t to maximum
output potential. Therefore TE is within the range of [0, 1]. When TEit¼ 1, the ith
firm obtains maximum feasible output at time t; when TEito1, there is a shortfall in
efficiency – the firm does not reach its maximum feasible output.
The SFA was first used in manufacturing industries in early studies. Later its
application was extended to the studies of banking industry and has become a commonly
used approach to study bank efficiency. Berger and Humphrey (1997) provide a
comprehensive survey on 130 financial institution efficiency studies in which SFA is one
of the five main approaches used in the literature. However, the special feature of banking
industry imposes some challenges in the application of SFA to bank efficiency studies.
Different from manufacturing firms, the output of banks (intermediation service) is
difficult to identify or measure. In the existing literature, some studies treat banks as
firms producing different deposit and loan accounts – the production approach, and use
the number and type of transactions and documents as a measure of bank output.
However, such data are usually unavailable to the public. Some others treat banks
as financial intermediaries channeling funds between depositors and borrowers – the
intermediation approach, and use bank loan and investment as output. In this study, we
follow Yao et al. (2007) and use the intermediation approach to measure bank output.
Although both loans and profits can be proxies for bank output (Yao et al., 2007),
profits are thought to be superior to loans as a measurement of bank output in the
estimation of bank efficiency. Earning assets such as loans are only intermediate
outputs with an ultimate purpose of income generation. As is found in the literature,
bank efficiency scores with loan-based models could be higher than that with profit-
based models (Yin et al., 2013; Yao et al., 2007). The efficiency estimates with loan model
could be inflated by imprudent lending. A bank may be very efficient in generating
income-earning assets, but less efficient in generating profit with poor asset quality
control. In China, government-directed or policy-oriented lending has caused high
levels of non-performing loans (NPLs) on banks’ balance sheets. As a result, using total
loans as bank output might exaggerate the efficiency of banks in China if NPLs are not
separated from total loans. This problem can be remedied by profit models as no
income could be generated from NPLs. Thus, we use pre-tax profits rather than loans to
measure bank output in this study. Bank inputs include fixed assets, deposits and
equity. The empirical model that we employ for our study is specified as follows:
ln prof ititð Þ ¼ b0þb1ln f ixed assetitð Þþb2ln deposititð Þþb3ln equityitð Þ
þyear dummiestþvit  uit (5)
where subscripts i and t denote individual banks and time, respectively. We add year










































changes in banking performance due to technological progress or changes in the
economic and regulatory environments.
With Equation (5), the efficiency score of each bank is estimated for each year over
the sample period. We also use bank efficiency rank as an alternative measure of bank
TE. We follow Berger et al. (2005) and construct efficiency rank based on an ordering of
the banks’ efficiency scores in each year: (Orderit−1)/(nt−1), where Orderit is the place
in ascending order of the ith bank in the tth year in terms of its efficiency score and nt is
the number of banks in year t. The ranks are converted to a uniform scale over [0, 1].
Thus, bank i’s efficiency rank in year t gives the proportion of the other sample banks
in tth year with lower efficiency level, i.e., a bank with a rank of 0.80 in year t implies
that 80 percent of other banks in China have efficiency level lower than the bank.
The bank with the highest efficiency score in year t has a rank value 1, and the bank
with the lowest efficiency score has a rank value 0.
Table III shows the summary statistics of the variables used in the stochastic
frontier model (Equation (5)), and the regression results are reported in Table IV.
It shows that banks’ pre-tax profit is positively related to all the input variables – fixed
assets, deposits and equity, as expected. All the coefficients are statistically significant
at 1 percent level. The estimated coefficients for fixed assets, deposits and equity
measure their elasticity with respect to bank profits. The reported likelihood ratio (LR)
tests whether there is technical inefficiency component in the model, and the result
confirms that there exists inefficiency when banks in China transform inputs into
profit.
2.2.2 IPO effect indicators. As is discussed earlier, we focus on the selection and
dynamic effects of IPOs on bank performance in China. The selection IPO indicator
identifies those banks that went public over the sample period. It equals one for the
corresponding banks for all time periods. The regression coefficient for this dummy
variable indicates the efficiency difference between the listed banks and non-listed
banks. We use two indicators to test the dynamic effects of IPOs on bank performance.
We first define a dummy variable (dynamic IPO indicator_dummy) that takes the value
of one for all publically listed banks for all time periods following the IPO event, and
equals zero for the periods prior to IPOs and for all periods for all the other banks that
have not gone public. This dummy variable captures the performance difference before
Year Pre-tax profit Fixed assets Deposit Equity
1999 238.03 929.35 43,294.15 2,559.76
2000 257.17 1,001.24 42,099.78 2,592.42
2001 291.66 1,083.00 46,470.14 2,786.54
2002 310.50 942.80 41,709.77 1,602.28
2003 459.66 853.20 44,630.85 604.50
2004 519.83 710.31 40,624.39 511.24
2005 505.09 569.83 35,900.46 1,966.99
2006 475.79 485.73 32,414.37 2,215.13
2007 731.01 450.32 33,239.83 1,916.43
2008 950.79 625.23 48,887.92 4,043.27
2009 1,079.69 708.04 61,040.39 4,632.74
2010 1,849.85 1,014.12 90,854.88 7,524.36
Total 771.41 707.72 48,062.75 3,062.69
Table III.
Summary statistics












































and after public listing. To investigate the long-term effects of bank IPOs, we include a
variable that measures the number of years that has lapsed since a particular bank went
through its IPO (dynamic IPO indicator_years since). This time variable equals one for
the year immediately following the bank IPO, two for the second year following the bank
IPO and so on. It equals zero for the years of and before its IPO and for all other banks.
2.2.3 Control variables. We control for bank size, bank type and include year fixed
effects in the analysis to account for the differences in bank size, bank ownership and
the changes in market and regulatory conditions, respectively. The average bank total
assets over the sample period range from 86.9 million to 942.3 billion US dollars.
The variation of bank size could have an impact on bank efficiency. We use the natural
logarithm of total assets in year t−1 to control for bank size in the regressions.
In addition to the state-owned Big Four, our sample also has 13 joint-stock banks, 116 city
commercial banks and 38 foreign-funded banks. It has been widely documented that
bank ownership is an important determinant of bank efficiency and state-owned banks
are the least efficient[5]. We control for bank type by including bank type dummies in the
regression, with state-owned banks excluded as the base case. We also include bank
equity ratio and fee-based asset share in our analysis to control for a bank’s risk attitude
and business orientation, respectively. Banks that maintain a higher level of capital tend
to be more risk averse and are found to be less efficient in the literature (Yao et al., 2007).
Lin and Zhang (2009) observe that banks’ fee income ratio is negatively associated with
cost to income ratio, suggesting that banks engaging in more non-banking business are
less efficient. With fee-based asset share as a measure of business structure, we conjecture
that banks with higher fee-based asset share are less efficient.
2.3 Data
We retrieve data for all the banks in China from 1999 to 2010 from the Bankscope and










No. of observations 824




Notes: This table presents the regression results of the stochastic frontier model. Profit is measured
with pre-tax profit of banks; Fixed assets, deposit and equity are measures of bank inputs. Year
dummy variables are included in the regressions with year 1999 as the omitted variable, although not
reported here. All variables are in natural logarithms except for the year dummies. Sigma_u is the SD
of inefficiency term and Sigma_v is the SD of random noise. λ is the ratio of SD of the half-normal
inefficiency term and random noise, that is Sigma_u/Sigma_v. Data are obtained from Bankscope. SEs














































banks with annual data available, which yields a total of 2,052 observations. However,
due to missing values for some of the variables, fewer observations are included in
some regressions. Table V shows the distribution of observations. Our sample includes
four state-owned banks (Big Four) with 48 observations, thirteen joint-stock banks with
156 observations, 116 city commercial banks with 1,392 observations and 38 foreign-
funded banks with 456 observations. The number of banks varies from 32 (in 1999) to
127 (in 2007) over the sample period. As of 2010, all Big Four state-owned banks had
finished public listing; nine of the 13 (69 percent) joint-stock banks had gone public;
among the 48 city commercial banks in 2010, only three were publically listed. The
number of banks that underwent public listing goes from two in 1999 to 16 in 2010[6].
3. Empirical results
The regression results for Equation (1) are reported in Table VI. The dependent variables
are bank efficiency measurements – TE score and TE rank estimated with production
function and stochastic frontier model. With each measure, we first test the IPO selection
effect only, and then add the dynamic dummy and dynamic time variables to the model
one by one. All the regressions control for year fixed effect and bank characteristics such
as bank type dummies, bank size, capital ratio and fee-based asset share. Column (1)
shows that there is a strong selection effect of bank IPOs on efficiency. The positive
coefficient for the selection dummy is significant at the 1 percent level, indicating that
banks that are selected for public listing are more efficient than the others that have not
gone public. After we add the dynamic dummy in the model (Column (2)), and include
both the dynamic dummy and time variables (Column (3)), the select effect still exists at
the 5 percent significance level.
With TE rank as the dependent variable, Columns (4)-(6) show strong evidence of
IPO selection effect – all coefficients are significant at the 1 percent level. The selection
effects we observe here suggest that the IPO banks in China outperform other banks
that have not gone public. Banking reform has been an important part of China’s
economic reform. In the process, more efficient banks are chosen for public listing.
Alternatively, the better performance of IPO banks may be attributable to the government
support that these IPO banks receive before their IPOs. For example, the Big Four























1999 4 10 10 8 32 0 2 0 2
2000 4 10 15 7 36 0 3 0 3
2001 4 10 16 5 35 0 3 0 3
2002 4 10 25 6 45 0 4 0 4
2003 4 10 29 6 49 0 5 0 5
2004 4 12 39 6 61 0 5 0 5
2005 4 12 57 8 81 1 6 0 7
2006 4 13 80 10 107 3 6 0 9
2007 4 13 85 25 127 3 8 2 13
2008 4 13 71 27 115 3 8 3 14
2009 4 13 70 30 117 3 8 3 14











































received capital injection from the government and transferred significant portions of their
NPLs to state-owned asset management corporations before they became publicly listed.
With respect to the dynamic effects of public listing, none of the coefficients are
statistically significant, regardless of the regression specifications (dynamic dummies
or time variables) or measures of bank efficiency. The results indicate that bank
efficiency did not improve after going public, either in the short term or in the long
term. These findings are consistent with those by Lin and Zhang (2009), who do not
observe dynamic effect of ownership change on bank performance that is measured
with financial ratios. The insignificant dynamic effects of Chinese bank IPOs may be
explained by two reasons. First, banks that go through IPOs usually outperform those
that do not prior to IPOs (the selection effect). As is argued by Lin and Zhang (2009),
it is more difficult to improve bank efficiency of better banks than to improve the
performance of worse banks. Second, the improvement of bank efficiency takes time.
The time might be too short to expect significant efficiency gain as most of the
publically listed banks in China went public after 2005.
We control for bank type by including bank type dummies in our regressions and
exclude state-owned banks (Big Four) as the base case. Table VI shows that joint-stock
banks, city commercial banks and foreign banks are all significantly more efficient
than state-owned banks (Columns (1)-(6)). With bank size being controlled with one
Technical efficiency Technical efficiency rank
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Selection_IPO 0.086*** 0.082** 0.082** 0.160*** 0.183*** 0.183***
(0.027) (0.034) (0.034) (0.050) (0.063) (0.063)
Dynamic_IPO 0.012 0.027 −0.022 −0.014
(0.033) (0.040) (0.060) (0.074)
Dynamic_IPO_time −0.003 −0.001
(0.004) (0.008)
Joint-stock banks 0.121** 0.128** 0.130** 0.225** 0.242*** 0.243***
(0.048) (0.050) (0.050) (0.088) (0.092) (0.092)
City commercial banks 0.081** 0.085** 0.089** 0.136** 0.150** 0.152**
(0.035) (0.038) (0.039) (0.065) (0.070) (0.071)
Foreign banks 0.163*** 0.170*** 0.171*** 0.295*** 0.316*** 0.317***
(0.044) (0.046) (0.046) (0.080) (0.085) (0.085)
Lnasset 0.004 0.004 0.004 0.000 0.001 0.001
(0.005) (0.006) (0.006) (0.010) (0.010) (0.010)
LnCAP −0.040*** −0.040*** −0.041*** −0.072*** −0.067*** −0.068***
(0.013) (0.013) (0.013) (0.024) (0.024) (0.025)
Fee-based asset share −0.086* −0.086* −0.089* −0.241*** −0.235*** −0.237***
(0.048) (0.048) (0.048) (0.088) (0.089) (0.089)
Constant 0.500*** 0.504*** 0.509*** 0.512*** 0.439** 0.442**
(0.091) (0.099) (0.099) (0.167) (0.182) (0.183)
n 667 656 656 667 656 656
R2 0.104 0.105 0.105 0.091 0.092 0.092
Notes: This table shows the regression results of bank efficiency measures on IPO selection and
dynamic indicators, controlling for bank type, size, risk attitude, business orientation and year fixed
effect (not reported here), which are measured with bank type dummies, logarithm of total assets for
year t−1, logarithm of bank capital asset ratio, fee-based asset share and year dummies, respectively.
Variable definitions are reported in Table II. SEs are in parentheses. *,**,***Significance at the 10, 5













































year lag of the logarithm of total assets, we fail to find significant relationship between
bank efficiency and size. Table VI also reports that bank capital ratio is negatively
associated with bank TE score and rank. In the literature, bank capital ratio is
considered as a measurement of a bank’s attitude toward risk, with higher ratio
implying less risk tolerance of a bank. The negative relationship we observe here
suggests that banks that are reluctant to take risk maintain a higher level of capital
and are less efficient than those that are more willing to take risk. Bank business
structure is controlled with fee-based asset ratio. With the development of banking system,
more products are offered by banks than the traditional deposit-taking-and-loan-making
business, such as investment banking, insurance and credit card, etc. With all
specifications and efficiency measurements, we find that banks that rely more on fee-
generating business are less efficient than those that focus more on the traditional
loan-making business.
Although the regression analysis discussed above suggests no dynamic effect of
bank IPOs in general, that is, post-IPO bank efficiency is not significantly different from
pre-IPO performance, it does not provide year by year information about the performance
around the year of IPO. Next we examine the effects of IPOs on bank performance by
comparing a bank’s performance between the year before IPO (Year −1), of IPO (Year 0)
and the first three years after IPO (Years +1, +2 and +3).
The change in efficiency of the issuing banks is measured relative to Year −1.
We measure the change in bank efficiency as the median change in efficiency measures,
i.e., the median value of {efficiencyi(t) – efficiencyi (−1)}, where i represents the bank,
−1 represents the year prior to the IPO, and t represents a post-IPO year end. Table VII
reports the median changes in bank efficiency for different time windows. Panel A of
Table VII shows that the median changes of bank efficiency are −0.092 and −0.080
for Years 0 and +1 relative to Year −1, which are significantly different from zero at
the 1 and the 5 percent levels, respectively. The median changes of bank efficiency
are −0.027 and 0.010 for Years +2 and +3 relative to Year −1, but they are not
statistically significant. This result indicates that bank efficiency deteriorates after
going public relative to the year prior to IPO, especially in Years 0 and +1. For the
Year relative to completion of IPO
Measure of operating performance From −1 to 0 From −1 to +1 From −1 to +2 From −1 to +3
Panel A: technical efficiency score
Median level in year −1¼ 0.685
Median change −0.092*** −0.080** −0.027 0.010
Number of observations 11 9 9 9
Panel B: technical efficiency rank
Median level in year −1¼ 0.620
Median change −0.211*** −0.281*** −0.084** −0.100
Number of observations 11 9 9 9
Notes: This table reports the efficiency changes of the IPO banks in China. Although there are 16
Chinese banks that have gone public at the end of the sample period, due to missing data, the number
of IPO banks we can use to investigate the performance change before and after IPO varies from nine
to 11. We compare efficiency measures from the year immediately before IPO to the three years after
the IPO event. Year −1 is the year prior to the year of IPO. The significance tests are based on the












































second and third year, bank efficiency scores are not significantly different from
the pre-IPO performance.
With TE rank as the measure of bank efficiency, Panel B of Table VII shows similar
results. The median changes in efficiency rank are −0.211, −0.281 and −0.084 for Years
0, +1 and +2 relative to Year −1, all significantly different from zero at either the 1 or
the 5 percent level. The median change in efficiency rank for Year +3 is −0.100, but not
statistically significant. This provides additional evidence that bank performance
decline relative to their pre-IPO levels for years immediately after their IPOs.
Both panels of Table VII show that bank performance improves gradually and reaches
their pre-IPO level in Years +2 or +3.
Although the results reported in Table VII suggest that bank efficiency of IPO
banks deteriorates for the first few years after IPO and picks up in later years, it is not
clear whether this path is due to general industry trend or specific for the IPO banks.
Loughran and Ritter (1995) match each IPO firm with a control firm of similar size.
As it has been documented in the literature that bank ownership is an important
determinant of bank efficiency, we match each IPO bank with a counterpart based on
bank size and ownership structure. Specifically, a bank with total assets closest to
the IPO bank and same ownership type at the end of the IPO year is selected as the
matched control bank, e.g., a joint-stock IPO bank is matched with a joint-stock bank
that has the closest total assets with the IPO bank and is not publically listed during the
IPO event window, i.e. Years −1 to +3. Presented in Figures 1 and 2 are the median
levels of bank efficiency measures (TE score or rank) for the IPO banks and their
industry counterparts for Years −1 to +3. In Figure 1, the median levels of bank
efficiency score are illustrated for the IPO banks and the control sample. It shows that
the performance of IPO banks declines substantially for Year 0 from Year −1, then
improves gradually for the next three years compared to Year 0, although the
performance is still not up to the pre-IPO level at the end of Year +3. However, Figure 1
shows a different picture for the control banks. We do not observe any obvious trend
for the control banks from Year −1 to Year +3. It is noteworthy that the IPO banks
substantially outperform their counterparts for Year −1, yet underperform their
counterparts for Year 0 due to the pronounced decline in bank efficiency of IPO banks
and improved performance of the control banks. For the next three years following the
IPOs, the IPO banks have similar performance as their counterparts.
With efficiency rank as the measure of bank performance, Figure 2 shows the same
pattern that the IPO banks’ performance decline substantially from Year −1 to Year 0,
while their industry counterparts gain efficiency for the same time period. IPO banks
outperform their counterparts prior to IPO, but underperform the control bank at the
year of IPO. For the next three years from Year +1, the IPO banks’ efficiency is higher
relative to that at Year 0, but still lower than the pre-IPO level, while the control
group’s efficiency is lower relative to that at Year 0, but substantially higher than the
pre-IPO level.
In summary, Figures 1 and 2 suggest that the IPO banks’ performance as measured
with TE score or rank is significantly better than that of their industry counterparts
for Year −1, but worse for Year 0. The IPO banks lose efficiency from Year −1 to 0,
although their industry counterparts gain efficiency over the same time horizon.
For the years subsequent to Year 0, the IPO firms do not significantly outperform or
underperform their industry counterparts. This suggests that the efficiency change
path we observe, i.e., the exceptional pre-IPO performance and subsequent efficiency










































specific to the IPO banks. We investigate the efficiency change path with median
instead of mean as reported in Table VII and Figures 1 and 2 because efficiency
measures may be skewed and the mean is particularly sensitive to outliers. For
robustness check purpose, we also use the mean and obtain similar results as that with
the median.
The observed superior pre-IPO performance may be explained by the window-
dressing hypothesis, which states that managers might attempt to window-dress their
accounting numbers prior to going public. By pumping up pre-IPO earnings, managers
manipulate investors’ beliefs so as to attract more investors and sell their stocks at
higher prices (Jain and Kini, 1994). As the efficiency measures we use in this study are
estimated with a production function and a SFA, and the before-tax profit is the output
in the production model, the inflated earnings prior to IPOs can lead to the overstated
pre-IPO performance and understated post-IPO performance. Another explanation for
the decline in bank performance is that managers may time their issues to coincide with
periods of unusually good performance levels that cannot be sustained in the future.
The third possible explanation for the findings is the agency problem described in
Jensen and Meckling (1976), which argues that agency costs might increase when a










–1 0 1 2 3
Year relative to IPO 
IPO banks Control banks
Notes: This chart displays the median level of technical efficiency
scores for the IPO banks in China from 1999 to 2010 and their
industry counterparts for Years –1 to +3 relative to the IPO. Technical
efficiency score is estimated with stochastic frontier approach and
production function. It measures the performance of a bank relative
to the best-practice frontier, with higher values representing better
performance. The solid bars represent IPO banks, while the shaded
bars represent the control group of banks that match the IPO banks
based on bank size and ownership type. The IPO banks are matched
with an industry counterpart based on bank size which is measured
with total assets and bank ownership type at the time of IPO, e.g., an
IPO bank that is a joint-stock bank is matched with a counterpart
that is also a joint-stock bank and has the similar bank size at the
time of its IPO. The counterpart bank must not be publically listed










































reduces the ownership of original owners, managers have more incentive to increase
perquisite consumption and/or invest the proceeds from IPOs into non-value-maximizing
projects. In addition, from Figures 1 and 2, we observe the worst performance at Year 0.
This may be due to the costs associated with IPOs such as legal fees, consultant expenses,
due diligence costs, etc. that are incurred in the year of the IPOs.
4. Summary and conclusions
We investigate the effects of IPO on bank performance in China. We follow the SFA to
measure bank performance. Our regression analysis finds support for the selection
effects documented in the literature: banks that are chosen to go public are significantly
more efficient than those that are not selected. However, we find no dynamic effects
of public listings, that is, IPO banks do not gain efficiency after their IPOs, either in the
short or the long run.
We also find that state-owned banks (Big Four) are the least efficient bank category
compared to joint-stock banks, city commercial banks and foreign banks. Bank size
does not matter to bank efficiency; banks that are more willing to take risk and
maintain lower capital are more efficient. We use the share of fee-generating assets in
total assets as a measure of a bank’s business orientation and find that banks that rely
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Year relative to IPO
IPO banks Control banks
Notes: This chart displays the median level of technical efficiency
rank for the IPO banks in China from 1999 to 2010 and their industry
counterparts for Years –1 to +3 relative to the IPO. Technical
efficiency rank is derived from technical efficiency score which is
estimated with stochastic frontier approach and production function.
Technical efficiency scores are ranked in ascending order for a year
and converted to a uniform scale over [0, 1]. Technical efficiency
rank measures the percentage of other banks that have efficiency
level lower than the bank, with higher values representing better
performance relative to the industry. The solid bars represent IPO
banks, while the shaded bars represent the control group of banks













































We compare performance between the IPO banks and their industry counterparts at
different times: the year prior to IPOs, the year of IPOs and each of the first three years
after IPOs. We observe that the IPO banks significantly outperform their industry
counterparts which match the IPO banks based on bank size and ownership type in the
year before their IPOs (Year −1). This is consistent with the results we find from
the regression analysis (the selection effects). However, the superior performance of the
IPO banks disappears upon their IPOs, especially for the year of IPOs (Year 0) when
the IPO banks’ performance is significantly worse than the control banks. However, for
the first three years after IPOs, the performance of the IPO banks improves relative to
Year 0, but the efficiency levels are still not up to the pre-IPO performance. Compared
with the industry counterparts, the IPO banks’ performance is not significantly
different from their counterparts for Years +1 to +3. The IPO banks’ worst performance
in Year 0 might be attributable to the one-time expenses related to the IPOs. The
generally poor post-IPO performance is consistent with some of the studies in the
literature, and could be explained by the window-dressing hypothesis, timing hypothesis
and/or agency theory, although we cannot pinpoint exactly the specific theory to explain
the phenomenon observed in this study[7].
Although the effect of privatization on bank performance has been well
documented in the literature, the performance of the IPO banks in China is still
understudied. There are a few studies addressing the relationship between
governance changes and bank performance in China, but the coverage of IPO
banks is very limited as their sample period is not beyond 2005 while most of the IPO
banks are listed after 2005[8]. This study supplements the existing literature by
providing more recent evidence on the effects of IPOs on bank efficiency with a more
comprehensive data set. Furthermore, no study in the literature examines the detailed
performance change around IPOs. We fill in this gap in our study and find that
bank performance deteriorates for the first three years immediately after their IPOs.
Our study adds additional evidence to literature on the effect of IPOs on
bank performance in China and provides some insights to the policy makers, bank
regulators and investors.
Notes
1. See Berger et al. (2009), Lin and Zhang (2009), Jiang et al. (2009) and Yao et al. (2007) for
detailed description of the development of China’s banking system.
2. Some other examples of country case studies are Beck et al. (2005) for Nigeria, di Patti and
Hardy (2005) for Pakistan and Haber (2005) for Mexico.
3. Different from some of the studies in the literature (e.g. Lin and Zhang, 2009), we do not
include the static effects of IPOs in our analysis because all Big Four have gone public during
the sample period, while static effects refers to the performance difference among banks that
have no change in governance over the sample period.
4. There are several different assumptions on the distribution of uit, such as half-normal,
truncated normal and exponential. There is no discussion in the literature on which
distribution assumption is better, although half-normal distribution is most often used.
5. See Yin et al. (2013) and Berger et al. (2009) for some examples.
6. As Shenzhen Development Bank Co. Ltd was first listed in 1991, it cannot be included in the
analysis of the dynamic effects of IPO on bank performance. Similar issue exists with








































7. Jain and Kini (1994) observe that earnings per share decline with time; Loughran and Ritter
(1995) also document poor performance of the IPO firms.
8. See Lin and Zhang (2009) and Jiang et al. (2009) for examples.
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